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Abstract: Prior to the global crisis, the SEE-7 had a strong 
growth performance through increasing in exports and 
capital inflows. However, they also, just like developing 
countries, suffered from the global economic crisis. The 
purpose of this paper is to analyze through what channels the 
global crisis had an impact on economic activity of the SEE-
7. Initially, we reviewed literature about contagion, 
including its definitions and its channels. We used panel 
data regression to analyze the impacts of external variables 
on GDP. According to empirical findings obtaining from the 
panel regression results, until the global crisis, the external 
variables significantly promoted the abilities of their growth. 
However, the contributions of external variables on their 
growth rate reduced sharply with the global crisis. 
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Introduction 
Before 1980, economists viewed financial crises as individual events. Thus, the 
channels of transmission between countries received little attention. With the 1990s 
the outbreak of several crises such as ERM (1992), Mexican crisis (1994-95) and the 
Asian crisis (1997-98) changed the perception that crises were individual events. 
These crises had systemic characteristics being quickly transmitted to other countries 
(Armada, Leitao and Lobao, 2008).  
The crises emanating from the emerging markets in 1990s impaired many countries 
with similar characteristics. Even some countries, which had been praised by market 
analysts and the multilateral institutions because of having apparently healthy 
fundamentals and policies, suffered from the crisis (Edwards, 2000). Economists 
have been interested in contagious crises since the second half of the 1990s.  Up to 
now, countless papers, both theoretical and empirical, about “contagion” have been 
studied (Bekaert et al, 2012). 
With occurrence of the global crisis in 2007, the first major one since the Great 
Depression, the contagion of financial crises has reappeared as an important issue. 
Although the crisis initially erupted in specific section of US’ credit market, the sub-
prime mortgage market, it has rapidly spread from developed countries to 
developing ones since last quarter of 2008. At the beginning of 2009, the crisis had 
significant implications for many developing countries. As a result, once again it 
triggered the debate about the presence of contagion. 
Since 2008, the global crisis has started to undermine the Southeastern Europe 
Countries (the SEE-7). The SEE-7 consists of a group of countries, including Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. 
They have some common characteristics as economically and politically. Firstly, they 
are new independent countries. Most of them gained their independence in the mid-
1990s after a violent war with destructive effects as economically. Secondly, their 
transitions from centrally planned to market economies occurred in the same period. 
In 1990s because of the conditions of war and transition, these economies had to 
struggle with both economic and politic distresses. Finally, after war, they reached a 
high level of economic and financial openness and thus exposed to the risk coming 
with the global crisis.   
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The main reason of economic contractions of the SEE-7 countries was the sharp 
reduction of their export capacities and foreign capital inflows (Cocozza et al., 
2011). Firstly, reducing in import demands of the developed countries shortened the 
export capabilities of other countries. Especially, small open economies like the SEE-
7 the export-oriented rapidly began to slump. Because the largest trade partner of the 
SEE-7 countries is European Union, they also incurred aftermaths of the global 
crisis.  
Secondly, the turmoil in the global credit markets led disappearance of the SEE-7 
countries’ financial facilities.  Diminishing in inflows of foreign direct investments, 
portfolio equity and contradiction in total reserves reduced their growth rates. As 
long as capital inflows diminished, the SEE-7 countries’ growth rate having been 
fuelled by the credit boom decreased. In addition, as their exchange rates 
depreciated, their real burden of foreign currency loans increased. Both their external 
debt stocks and interest payments on external debts rapidly rose. The extent of 
openness to flows of foreign direct investment has been a major cause of the 
transmission of the effects of the crisis for the region (Bartlett and Prica, 2011).  
The purpose of this paper is to analyze through what channels the global crisis had 
an impact on economic activity of the SEE-7. Although many economists have 
examined how the global crisis affected the economic performance of the SEE-7, 
these papers are not based on an econometric analysis. Therefore, the main aim of 
the paper is to fill this gap and provide empirical evidences. The study analyses the 
effects of external variables, which many of them are components of the balances of 
payments, on GDP growth rate of SEE-7 in 2000-2010. The paper examines these 
effects in two different periods. The first, from 2000 to 2007, consists of the period 
prior to the global crisis. 2007-2010 represents post-crisis period. The study uses 
panel data regression to analyze the impacts of external variables on GDP. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews some related theoretical 
literature about contagion.  Section 3 is about contagion channels of the global crisis 
in the SEE-7 countries. In fourth section, an econometric analysis identifies the 
effects of external variables on GDP growth rates of the SEE-7 economies. Section 5 
includes conclusions. 
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Contagion: A Literature Review 
The fact that the crises spread more rapidly has been an unavoidable fate of more 
integrated world (Stiglitz, 2010). Thus, after seminal work of King and Wadhwani 
(1990) following the global October 1987 stock market crash, many economics have 
studied how crises were spread from a country to another.  
Current literature has focused on especially three issues about “contagion”. The first 
of them is interested in definition of contagion. The second has been what are the 
channels through which financial crisis is transmitted across countries (Edwards, 
2000). While at first many economists focused on trade linkages and 
macroeconomic similarities between economies, analyses that are more recent have 
examined the role of common investors through financial capital movements 
(Kannan and Köhler-Geib, 2009). The third is about possible mechanisms of 
avoiding the contagion.  
King and Wadhwani (1990) investigated why all stock markets having different 
economic circumstances suffered from the stock market crash of October 1987. 
They claimed that “contagion” was as a result of effort by rational agents to deduce 
from price changes in other markets. Thus, a mistake in a market can spread to other 
markets. According to them, the correlation between markets rises after the crash.        
Eichengreen et al. (1996) investigated whether currency crises spread from one 
country to another or not. Using thirty years of panel data from twenty developed 
countries, they concluded that crises were more likely to spread to countries that tied 
trade than to countries in similar fundamentals.     
Glick and Rose (1998) argue that currency crises tend to be regional. Thus, 
contagion is related to geographic proximity. They claims that there are at least two 
different sorts of contagion. The first relies on macroeconomic or financial similarity. 
A crisis may spread from the initial target to another if the two countries share 
various economic features. Initially, they, like many economists, adopted that trade 
was the most important channel for contagion. They showed that currency crises 
influenced countries strongly tied by trade. According to them, macroeconomic and 
financial similarities are not important in contagion of crises.  
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According to Fratzscher (2000), “contagion” is defined as the transmission of a crisis 
to a country because of its real and financial interdependence with countries already 
suffering from a crisis. Fratzscher (2000) adopts that there are three channels of 
contagion. The first of them is the real interdependence among economies through 
trade competition (Fratzscher, 2000). A crisis generally spreads from an economy to 
another if they are sides of bilateral trade or strong competitors in third markets. A 
second is the financial interdependence among countries competing for bank lending 
in third markets. The countries can have at least two different financial linkages. The 
first are direct financial linkages that financial institutions may have large cross-
border holdings. The second are indirect financial linkages, including a common 
lender decisions by institutional investors. The common lender can call loans and 
reject to give new credit. Again, institutional investors may withdraw funds both 
from the country that occurred crisis and from other countries. The third channel is 
herd behavior that arises from exogenous shifts in investor beliefs. Shifts in investor 
beliefs are related neither to country-specific fundamentals nor to interdependencies 
across economies.  
Pericoli and Sbracia (2001) analyzed possible channels of contagion. They reviewed 
contagion definitions and its channels in literature. They used a simple multi-
country asset-pricing model to shed light the contagion discussion. Their model 
produced how crises can spread from a country to another.     
Forbes and Rigobon (2001) analyzed whether bond and stock market crash in Latin 
America spread or not. They classified contagion channels as two groups: crisis-
contingent and non-crisis-contingent channels. While the former can change during 
a crisis, the latter does not change both in crisis times and in tranquil times also. 
Their results confirmed that contagion occurred via non-crisis-contingent channels, 
such as trade.  
Caramazza et al. (2004) examined contagion in four categories: common shocks, 
trade spillovers, financial linkages and changes in investor sentiment. Common 
shocks, such as a surge in world interest rates, a reducing in world aggregate demand, 
a decline in commodity prices, or changes in exchange rates can simultaneously lead 
to pressures on the countries’ currencies. As a result, because of interaction of a 
common shock and domestic fundamentals may induce the simultaneous crises. 
They asserted that if a country suffered from a crisis because of a depreciation of its 
currency, trade spillovers could damage its trade partners. According to them, 
financial linkages also can be a channel of contagion effects. The outbreak of a crisis 
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in one country may induce investors to rebalance their portfolios. Investors having 
positions in one country that occur a crisis will reduce their positions to avoid 
increased risk exposure and will sell assets. Because crises increase financial 
vulnerability and fragility, some countries may incur capital outflows without 
worsening their macroeconomic fundamentals. Camarazza et al. (2004) also claim 
that changes in investor feelings might also play a major role in the contagion of 
crises. A crisis can move investors to reconsider the situation of their portfolios in 
other countries.     
Bekaert et al (2011) examine a number of contagion channels. The first channel 
includes international banking sector links at the country level and the role of 
various financial policies being implemented during the crisis. The second channel 
consists of trade and financial linkages as a measurement of being of integrated 
globally (globalization hypothesis). Third, the presence of crises may reduce 
asymmetric information, as investors focus on easily available public information. As 
a result, this case may increase correlations. Fourth, the occurrence of a crisis in one 
country means that new information may prompt investors to reassess the 
vulnerability of other countries. The fifth channel is herd behavior or investors’ risk 
appetite so that contagion may occur without discrimination at all. Missio and 
Watzka (2011) investigated by dynamic conditional correlation models 
whether contagion effects were identifiable during the Euro crisis or not. In 
addition, they also analyzed whether EU countries’ problems originated by 
their fundamentals or not. Their results showed the presence of contagious 
effects during the Euro Crisis. Especially, Greek financial problems were 
transmitted by contagion to other EU countries, such as Portugal, Spain and 
Italy.  
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The Contagion Channels of the Global Crisis in the SEE-7  
From the beginning of 2000s to 2008, the SEE-7 had a strong growth performance. 
All the SEE-7 countries experienced rapid increase of economic output pre-crisis. 
The policies of economic stability and restructuring seriously contributed to this 
achievement (Nero, 2010). In addition, increasing in their exports and capital 
inflows integrated them into the global economic system and provided a significant 
contribution of their growth performances. As a result, during 2000-2007, they had 
an average growth rate about 4.9 % (Table 1). However, in 2008-2010, the same 
rate reduced 0.9 %. Investments, remittances, industrial production, foreign 
exchange reserves and employment rates have fallen sharply. As a result, growth has 
slowed down (Ismail and Sahin, 2009). Especially, Slovenia, Croatia and 
Montenegro further suffered from the global crisis.   
Table 1. Growth Rates, (%) 
 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Croatia Macedonia Montenegro Serbia Kosovo Slovenia 
2000 5.5 3.8 4.5 3.1 5.3  4.3 
2001 4.4 3.7 -4.5 1.1 5.3 27.0 2.9 
2002 5.3 4.9 0.9 1.9 4.1 -0.7 3.8 
2003 4.0 5.4 2.8 2.5 2.7 5.4 2.9 
2004 6.1 4.1 4.6 4.4 9.3 2.6 4.4 
2005 5.0 4.3 4.4 4.2 5.4 3.8 4.0 
2006 6.2 4.9 5.0 8.6 3.6 6.0 5.8 
2007 6.8 5.1 6.1 10.7 5.4 6.3 6.9 
2000-07 5.4 4.5 3.0 4.6 5.1 7.2 4.4 
2008 5.4 2.2 5.0 6.9 3.8 6.9 3.6 
2009 -2.9 -6.0 -0.9 -5.7 -3.5 2.9 -8.0 
2010 0.8 -1.2 1.8 2.5 1.0 4.0 1.4 
2008-10 1.1 -1.7 1.9 1.2 0.4 4.6 -1.0 
 
According to Stiblar (2009), they were small and weak local capital markets, 
overdependence on capital inflows from Western Europe. They were highly 
dependent on external inflows of money, either capital investments or loans, and 
foreign financial aid. Sanfey (2010) argued that during the past decade, the SEE-7 
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has experienced a serious transformation such as economic development, democratic 
reforms, and integration into global economic and financial markets. On the other 
hand, the SEE-7 countries had huge current account deficits and thus needed 
foreign credit or investments (Gligorov and Landesmann, 2009). 
Beltramello et al. (2009) described the global crisis as an “imported” crisis, because 
its origin was countries in Western Europe and North America. Due to falling 
demand from key EU trade partners, the region’s exports declined substantially. 
According to Risteski and Trpkova (2009), the main channels of the crisis were trade 
shocks, lower remittances and lower foreign direct investments. As a result, credit 
growth decelerated and domestic demand shrunk.  
According to Jerger and Knogler, (2009), the first of contagion channel of the crisis 
was decline of export demand. Decline in export demand obviously became more 
painful for countries with high export dependence. Export of goods and services as a 
percentage of GDP in Slovenia, Macedonia and Croatia is respectively 67%, 50% 
and 42% in 2008. The second leading channel was a considerable amount of debt 
denominated in foreign currencies. The burden of this debt increased with 
devaluation of the domestic currency. 
Bartlett and Monastiriotis (2010) claimed that as the SEE banking systems were not 
directly exposed to ‘toxic assets’, the crisis was transmitted to the region through a 
number of indirect channels. These included a contraction of international trade, a 
sudden stop to credit growth, a rapid fall in inflows of foreign direct investment. 
Over the last decade, foreign investors reached extensive opportunities, besides the 
banking sector, in telecommunications, energy and other sectors opened up by 
privatization.  
According to IMF (2009), the SEE–7 suffered from the global crisis more than in 
previous ones, because they were more integrated with the global economy via trade, 
FDI, and remittances. The crisis significantly influenced these countries through 
reduced demand for their exports. Rising interest rates increased debt service costs. 
Increasing trade and financial links with the outside world also imply a greater 
dependence on external conditions. Because the slowdown in global growth reduced 
trade, remittances, foreign direct investment, these factors had a major impact on the 
SEE–7. Tightened global liquidity conditions adversely affected financing facilities. 
The SEE-7 countries developed a model of growth dependent on capital inflows 
from abroad; with the global credit crunch undermined their ability to maintain this 
growth strategy (UN, 2009). The growth financed by short-term and external bank 
borrowing came to a sudden stop in 2008 (IMF, 2011). 
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Sewel (2011) argued that transmission mechanism of the crisis was not the banking 
and financial system. Rather the serious decline in export markets and the collapse of 
foreign direct investment that had the origin of recent growth and development in 
the region adversely affected their performance. Virtually all of the SEE-7 had 
current account deficits prior to the crisis.  Generally, current account deficits are 
quite normal for such developing countries in the beginning of growth. The first 
growth spurt is frequently financed by inflows of investment, capital goods and 
equipment. Moreover, their physical capital legacy had already become old largely. 
Thus, they needed new enormous investment facilities as both physical and financial 
capital stocks (Gallego, 2010). Until the global crisis, the availability of export 
facilities and significant capital inflows for SEE-7 have helped finance their growth 
spurt (Sewel, 2011). 
Jovicic (2009) studied the relationship between the degree of trade integration to the 
EU market and the timing and intensity of the onset of the crisis effects among the 
Western Balkan countries. She found that while those with a high degree of trade 
integration experienced the crisis sooner, those with a lower degree of integration 
experienced a larger decrease in production. 
 
Econometric Model and Results 
From 2000 to 2010, the dataset is composed of annual data for the SEE-7 countries. 
These countries are Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Slovenia. Annual data obtained from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI). The study using panel data regression analyzes the 
impacts of external variables on GDP during the global crisis and in pre-crisis period. 
To compare crisis period with the pre-crisis period it is analyzed 2000-2007 and 
2000-2010 separately. The aim is to examine in both period data set.      
Data set consists of 10 variables. The dependent variable is Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) as a change of percentage. As a share of percent of GDP the independent 
variables are Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Private Capital Flows (PCF), 
Portfolio Equity (POE), Total Reserves (TOR), Export of Goods and Service (EXP), 
Import of Goods and Service (IMP), Official Exchange Rate (OER), External Debt 
Stocks (EDS), and Interest Payments on External Debt (IPE).  
The paper has four different models analyzing the impacts of external variables on 
GDP growth rate. 
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𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                     
(2) 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                       
(3) 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                   
(4)              
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽6𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖             (5) 
To estimate models, it uses the OLS method. Firstly, to eliminate the problem of 
Poisson regression, unit roots are tested for each variable. Levin, Lin, Chu (LLC) and 
Im, Pesaran, Shin (IPS) unit root results are in Table 2. According to Table 2, all 
variables are stationary in the first level I (1).   
Table 2. The Results of Panel Unit Root Test 
Variables Levin, Lin, Chu Im, Peseran, Shin 
t statistic Results W  statistic  Results 
GDP -1,734** I(1) -1,435* I(1) 
FDI -4,056*** I(1) -1,953** I(1) 
PCF -3,065*** I(1) -1,386* I(1) 
POE -1,879** I(1) -2,372*** I(1) 
TOR -5,083*** I(1) -2,471*** I(1) 
EXP -4,199*** I(1) -1,825** I(1) 
IMP -1,665** I(1) -1,206* I(1) 
OER -5,298*** I(1) -4,949*** I(1) 
EDS -3,044*** I(1) -1,777** I(1) 
IPE -5,331*** I(1) -3,104*** I(1) 
 
Secondly, it is investigated whether the problems of autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. The availability of autocorrelation problem is tested by 
Wooldridge test; the availability of heteroskedasticity problem is analyzed by Wald 
test. In models it is implemented Estimated Generalized Least Squares (EGLS) to 
eliminate the autocorrelation problem. White’s cross section coefficient covariance 
method is applied to eliminate heteroskedasticity problem.  
Thirdly, it is determined the method (fixed effects or random effects) to estimate the 
models using the Hausman test. Finally, in estimating the models, it is analyzed two 
different periods (2000-2007 and 2000-2010) separately (Table 3).  
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Table 3. The Results 
Variables 2000-2007 2000-2010 
Model   
1 
Model  
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model  
4 
FDI -0.016 
(-0.002) 
  3.864 
(1.257) 
21.648* 
(1.897) 
  5.240 
(1.355) 
PCF 4.933 
(0.536) 
  -2.580 
(-
0.362) 
-
18.975 
(-
0.807) 
  1.366 
(0.138) 
POE -8.658** 
(2.167) 
  -
5.199*** 
(-
2.860) 
-
29.576*** 
(-2.888) 
  -
16.367** 
(-1.097) 
TOR -8.248 
(-1.565) 
  0.767 
(0.133) 
-21.425 
(-1.255) 
  -8.099 
(0.133) 
EXP  -1.626 
(-1.579) 
 -2.507** 
(-
2.677) 
 19.800 
(0.874) 
 11.939 
(1.216) 
IMP  -0.630 
(-0.998) 
 -0.299 
(-
0.614) 
 -
3.283** 
(-
2.290) 
 4.124 
(0.758) 
OER  -10.962 
(-1.095) 
 -15.80* 
(-
1.725) 
 -
22.307 
(-
1.463) 
 -9.734 
(-1.288) 
EDS   3.515 
(1.228) 
6.400** 
(2.187) 
  -7.444 
(-
0.960) 
-5.511** 
(-2.063) 
IPE   -1.493 
(-
0.202) 
4.389 
(0.985) 
  -
32.843 
(-
1.173) 
-8.676 
(-1.042) 
R2 0.813 0.809 0.803 0.873 0.177 0.187 0.145 0.452 
Adj R2 0.787 0.788 0.788 0.832 0.105 0.131 0.102 0.347 
F statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.015 0.024 0.000 
N 42 42 42 42 63 63 63 63 
D-W 2,079 2.108 2.217 2.225 2.194 2.147 2.029 2.021 
Woolridge 
test 
0,003 0,007 0,001 0,005 0,001 0,005 0,001 0,004 
Wald test 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Hausman 
test 
RE RE RE RE RE RE RE RE 
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* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; t values in brackets.  
 Table 3 shows the results from panel OLS regressions for the SEE-7 countries in 
two different periods that are 2000-2007 and 2000-2010. It is estimated four models 
for each period. Model 1 includes four variables that foreign direct investment, 
private capital flows, portfolio equity and total reserves. Model 2 consists of three 
variables that are export, import and official exchange rate. Model 3 comprises only 
two variables that are external debt stock and interest payments on external debt. 
Model 4 have all variables in other models.  
Although, for each variable, it is not obtained enough significant results from the 
panel regressions, these models reveal a striking empirical evident coinciding with a 
main hypothesis of this paper. Adjusted R2 has higher values in 2000-2007 than 
2000-2010 does. In other words, the models for 2000-2007 have more explanatory 
power than 2000-2010 do. The effects of external variables on GDP growth rate in 
the SEE-7 countries are further in the pre - crisis period. From 2000 to 2007, in 
other words until the global crisis, the external variables contributed to growth 
performances of these economies. However, the impacts of external variables on 
GDP growth rate naturally reduced sharply during the crisis. For example, in model 
4 including all variables, while adjusted R2 is 0.832 for 2000-2007, the same value is 
only 0.347 for 2000-2010.  
Conclusions 
With occurrence of the global crisis, the contagion of financial crises has reappeared 
as an important issue. The crisis has rapidly spread from developed countries to 
developing ones since last quarter of 2008. As a result, once again it triggered the 
debate about the presence of contagion.  
Since 2008, the global crisis has started to undermine the Southeastern Europe 
Countries (the SEE-7). The impacts of the global crisis were transmitted across the 
SEE-7 countries by two different channels. The first of contagion channels of the 
global crisis is a deficiency of import demand of the developed countries shortening 
the export capabilities of other countries. The second of them is the disappearance of 
their financial facilities because of turmoil in the global finance and capital markets. 
Although many economists have examined how the global crisis affected the 
economic performance of the SEE-7, these papers are not based on an econometric 
analysis. The purpose of this paper is to analyze through what channels the global 
crisis had an impact on economic activity of the SEE-7. Initially, we have reviewed 
the theoretical and empirical literatures on contagion. Then, we used panel data 
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regression to analyze the effects of external variables on GDP growth rate in the 
SEE-7 in two different periods. 2000-2007 is the period of pre-crisis. 2007-2010 
comprises the post-crisis period. Thus, it is possible to compare with two different 
periods with respect to impacts of external indicators. According to empirical 
findings from the panel regression results, until the global crisis, the external 
variables significantly contributed to growth performances of these economies. 
However, the impacts of external variables on GDP growth rate naturally reduced 
sharply during the crisis. Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that 
currency crises spread because of trade linkages.  
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